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Abstract 
In the paper we review Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa, which have increased significantly in the last 
decade. The pattern and magnitude of China’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) to Sub-Sahara African 
countries of operations is examine. We first analyse the recent trends of China’s outward FDI, with sectoral and 
geographical distributions, and then looks at the characteristics and activities of Chinese multinational enterprises 
and assesses their key motives for investing in the region. This report discusses how Africa could take advantage 
of the untapped opportunities offered by China’s progressively intensifying investment and trade ties with SSA. It 
is hoped that this analysis will enrich the ongoing dialogue between policy makers, private firms, and civil society 
regarding China’s increasingly important role in the growth and development of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has averaged roughly 5 percent per year over the past decade, 
improving living standards and bolstering human development indicators across the continent. Stronger public 
institutions, a supportive, private sector–focused policy environment, responsible macroeconomic management, 
and a sustained commitment to structural reforms have greatly expanded opportunities for countries in SSA to 
participate in global markets. In recent years, many countries in the region have benefited from an increasingly 
favorable external environment, high commodity prices, and an especially strong demand for natural resources by 
emerging economies, particularly China. 
China-SSA trade has rapidly intensified since the late 1990s and in 2013 China became SSA’s largest 
export and development partner. China now represents about a quarter of SSA’s trade, up from just 2.3 percent in 
1985. About one-third of China’s energy imports come from SSA—a vital trade link, especially as energy 
consumption rates in China have grown by more than twice the global average over the past 10 years. Despite 
increased efficiency and rising domestic production, rapid urbanization and heavy industrialization continue to 
spur robust Chinese demand for coal, oil, and natural gas. China’s banks, notably the People’s Bank of China, the 
China Development Bank, and the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank of China), have supported large-
scale investments in African infrastructure. More than 2,200 Chinese enterprises are currently operating in SSA, 
most of them private firms (UNCTAD 2014; Shen 2014). Diplomatic contacts and bilateral aid and cooperation 
initiatives have greatly expanded,1 and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, formed in 2000 and convened 
every three years, has become the primary institutional vehicle for China’s strategic engagement with SSA. 
After expanding at an average annual rate of 10 percent through the early 2010s, growth of China’s annual 
gross domestic product (GDP) has slowed to 7.5 percent during the past two years. The doubling of Chinese capital 
stock between 2005 and 2011 has resulted in excess production capacity and the rate of return on capital is 
declining. Meanwhile, average household consumption remains low by international standards. The Government 
of China has responded by initiating a gradual process of economic rebalancing designed to shift the economy 
toward a more sustainable model, one in which growth will be driven less by investment and exports and more by 
domestic consumption. These policies will be complemented and sustained by the continued implementation of 
deep structural reforms to promote a more open and competitive private sector. The rebalancing of the Chinese 
economy will not only have profound domestic implications, but will also permanently alter the pattern of 
international trade and investment flows, presenting important challenges and enormous opportunities for 
developed and developing countries. 
China’s lower growth rate and changing demand composition are already affecting commodity prices, 
with particularly strong impacts on global mineral markets. At the same time, the tripling of Chinese labor costs 
over the past decade has enabled countries with large labor forces and low wage rates to compete with Chinese 
producers and even attract investment from Chinese firms. This report explores the impacts of China’s economic 
rebalancing on its trade and investment partners in SSA. The report uses information from the Government of 
China as well as international databases and individual case studies to review the latest available information on 
                                                          
1 For example, on May 22, 2014, the African Development Bank and the People’s Bank of China established a US$2 billion 
co-financing fund, the “Africa Growing Together Fund,” which will finance a range of development projects in SSA (AfDB 
2014).   
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China-SSA trade and foreign direct investment (FDI)1 flows. The objective of the report is to contribute to an 
informed policy debate as to how SSA can leverage the complex changes taking place in the Chinese economy to 
accelerate growth, enhance development outcomes, and maximize the benefits of SSA’s increasingly strong ties 
to one of the world’s most dynamic economic powers. 
 
2. Chinese Trade with SSA 
Trade flows between China and SSA have expanded dramatically during the past decade and show no signs of 
slowing in the foreseeable future. China-SSA trade has grown by a remarkable 26 percent per year since 1995, 
reaching a total value of US$170 billion in 2013. China now accounts for roughly 24 percent of SSA’s total trade, 
up dramatically from a mere 2.3 percent in 1995. Yet despite China’s enormous and rapidly increasing importance 
in the region, its economic relationship with SSA is not symmetric: in 2013, SSA’s share in Chinese trade reached 
just 3 percent (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 Trade between China and SSA 
a.Relative trade share 
 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution Data, World Bank 
b. Imports, exports and trade balance 
 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution Data, World Bank 
SSA’s exports to China have grown faster than its imports, generating a large, positive trade balance. SSA’s 
exports are concentrated in primary commodities, especially extractable resources such as oil, uranium, aluminum, 
zinc, phosphates, copper, nickel, and gold, as well as renewable resources and agricultural commodities such as 
timber, rubber, coffee, cotton, cocoa, fish, and cashew nuts. While SSA’s export mix is narrowly focused on the 
primary sector, Africa’s imports from China are extremely diversified. Consumer goods represent the largest share, 
                                                          
1 According to the OECD definition (see annex 2), FDI includes only private financial flows. However, in China’s case this 
definition is inadequate. “Outward direct investment” (as defined in MOFCOM’s annual Statistical Bulletin of China), which 
also includes overseas investment by state-owned companies, is a more appropriate measure. Consequently, this report uses 
“FDI” to describe all Chinese outward direct investment, public and private.   
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particularly textiles and clothing, footwear, and consumer electronics, but capital goods such as machinery, 
commercial electronics, and transportation equipment are also well represented (Figure 2). Chinese products are 
often less expensive than similar products imported from the European Union or the United States, which makes 
the products attractive to firms and individual consumers alike. In addition, Chinese capital goods imports are 
boosted in the presence of large Chinese-financed infrastructure projects, which frequently include country-of-
origin procurement rules. 
Figure 3 Trade Flows: SSA and Selected Partners 
 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution Data, World Bank 
For decades, SSA exports were overwhelmingly oriented toward Western markets, but the region’s trade 
relationships are shifting; in 2013, China became SSA’s most important export partner. China now accounts for 
27 percent of SSA’s exports, compared with 23 percent for the European Union and 21 percent for the United 
States. While India accounts for just 9 percent, the growth rate of SSA’s exports to India is second only to that of 
China. 
a.Trade volume (Base year 1997=100) 
 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution Data, World Bank 
b.Destination of SSA’s exports  
 
Percentage of SSA’s export 
SSA’s exports to China continue to be dominated by renewable and nonrenewable natural resources (annex 3). 
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Moreover, the share of natural resources in the export mix has been increasing over time. Resource exports 
accounted for about 84 percent of all SSA’s exports to China between 2008 and 2013, up from about 79 percent 
between 2002 and 2007. Manufactures have remained roughly stable over time, but agricultural exports have 
essentially collapsed (Figure 4). SSA is currently exporting a very small percentage of agricultural products, 
despite indications that demand for these commodities is likely to increase in the future. 
Figure 4. Sector Distribution of SSA’s Exports to China  
 
 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution Data, World Bank 
 
Evolution of China-SSA Trade 
SSA’s exports to China can be grouped under four major categories: agricultural goods, oil, non-oil natural 
resources, and manufactures. SSA has a revealed comparative advantage1 (RCA) in the first three categories and 
a comparative disadvantage in the fourth. SSA’s largest comparative advantage is in oil production, although its 
RCA has declined since the early 2000s. By contrast, SSA’s competitiveness in non-oil natural resources, which 
include non-oil energy products and minerals, has increased over time. Manufactures have the lowest RCA and 
the competitiveness of agricultural exports has decreased significantly since the early 2000s (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 SSA’s Exports to China and Revealed Comparative Advantages 
 Share of total exports to China 
(%) 
SSA’s RCA Compound annual growth rate 
(%) 
Agricultural goods 2003 2013 2003 2013 2003-2013 
Agricultural goods 12.25 5.53 2.18 1.3 5.82 
Oil 62.64 55.62 3.58 2.93 15.75 
Non-Oil natural 
resources 
10.44 25.04 1.6 1.73 15.04 
Manufactures 14.67 13.81 0.54 0.39 6.28 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution data, World Bank; mirror data2.  
Note: RCA = revealed comparative advantage; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. 
SSA’s agricultural exports to China have the lowest compound annual growth rate of any trade category. 
Although production volumes and logistical constraints in SSA are driving this trend, significant trade protections 
in the Chinese market also play an important role. China’s average most-favored-nation tariffs on agricultural 
goods are relatively high; they increased from 15.9 percent in the mid-2000s to 22.5 percent in 2014. 
Overall, SSA has benefitted from China’s increasing demand for SSA’s exports of oil, minerals, and 
metals (Roache 2012; Broadman 2007). Exporters in SSA have faced very limited competition from Chinese 
exports in third markets, as many of SSA’s export products are unrelated, or even complementary, to Chinese 
products in key markets such as the European Union and the United States. However, there is evidence that imports 
from China have had a negative effect on SSA’s exports within the African regional market, and local producers 
and traders have faced serious competition from Chinese imports throughout SSA (Figure 5). 
                                                          
1 This report uses Balassa’s (1965) definition of RCA, which is the region's share of world exports of a given good divided by 
its share of total world exports. The computed values indicate whether the region has a comparative advantage or disadvantage 
in each category. Scores greater than 1 reflect a comparative advantage, while scores lower than 1 reflect a comparative 
disadvantage.   
2 Mirror data refers to data reported by trading partners (UN 2010).   
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During 2000–11, almost 70 percent of African countries saw their real exchange rate appreciating—the 
result of pegging their currency to other currencies (in particular to the euro); the surge in exports of natural 
resources and raw materials; and the amount of financial assistance from international donors, including China. In 
a recent paper, Guillaumont Jeanneney and Hua (2014) show that although Africa’s exports to China have 
contributed to SSA’s economic growth, China’s strong import penetration has negatively affected the 
manufacturing sector and may prevent Africa from diversifying its own industry. The countries most affected were 
those pegging their currency to the euro. Since the renimbi was de facto pegged to the dollar and the dollar was 
undervalued relative to the euro, these African countries were handicapped in competing against China’s 
manufactured goods. In a study of 44 South African manufacturing industries during 1992–2010, Edwards and 
Jenkins (2014) show that laborϋintensive industries were particularly badly affected by Chinese imports and the 
negative impact on employment was more than proportional to the output displacement. Moreover, exports of 
manufactures to China did not add significantly to industrial growth in South Africa. But Edwards and Jenkins 
also find evidence that Chinese imports contributed toward lower producer price inflation in South Africa, which 
in turn contributed to a moderation in consumer price increases. 
Figure 5 Price Gap between Chinese and African Producer Prices 
 
Source: Pigato and Gourdon 2014 
There is no question that low prices for imported Chinese goods have benefitted African consumers, as 
well as producers who rely on imported inputs and capital goods. Figure 5 shows the gap between SSA’s producer 
prices1 and the prices of Chinese imports in SSA. The comparison reveals a considerable price gap between 
China’s and SSA’s products of about 50 percent. 
More troubling, African firms do not appear to be positioning themselves within Chinese value chains; 
as a consequence, trade with China is having a limited impact on economic transformation and export 
diversification. Imports of inputs and components for processing and assembly have been a major channel for 
technology transfer in many countries in Asia, particularly China. In the standard model, a firm from a developed 
country would export inputs or components to a less developed country with lower wage rates, where a local 
subsidiary would use those inputs to create a finished product for export to one or more third-country markets or 
even back to the original developed country. For many countries, this pattern of trade has had highly positive 
economic impacts by facilitating technology transfer and catalyzing the development of dynamic comparative 
advantage. Input exports from China to SSA for processing and subsequent re-export to the U.S. consumer market 
have increased in recent years but remain extremely small as a share of total trade (Pigato and Gourdon 2014). 
Consequently, there is very little evidence that China is using Africa as a platform for its global exports or 
integrating African firms into its international value chains. 
 
3. Chinese FDI in Africa, 2000–13 
Following a contraction in 2012, global FDI flows began growing again in 2013 to reach US$1.45 trillion, still 
below their 2007 peak just before the global financial crisis (UNCTAD 2014). Since 2009, FDI flows to developed 
economies2 have fluctuated substantially, while transition and developing economies have experienced a steady 
                                                          
1 Using the trade unit–value database at the HS 6 digit level, we compare each African good’s FOB export price with the CIF 
import price of a similar good from China. This yields a set of comparable African producer prices and Chinese import prices, 
for which we then compute an average difference by HS section.   
2 Countries are grouped according to the following definitions (UNCTAD 2014): “Developed countries include the member 
states of the OECD (with the exception of Chile, Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Turkey), plus new European Union 
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increase in investment. In 2012, for the first time ever, the share of FDI received by developing economies 
exceeded the share received by developed economies. In 2013, developing economies widened this lead, hitting a 
new high of US$778 billion or 54 percent of global FDI (Figure 6).  
Figure 6 FDI Flows, Global and by Developmental Group, 2000–13  
(US$ billions) 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2014 
Global FDI flows to SSA increased by 9.2 percent in 2013 to reach US$45 billion, slightly faster than the global 
FDI growth rate. Meanwhile, SSA’s share of global FDI inflows increased from an average of 1.8 percent between 
2000 and 2009 to 3.1 percent in 2013. The region’s main sources of investment are the European Union and the 
United States, which in 2012 accounted for 26 percent and 9 percent of total FDI inflows, respectively. South 
Africa is also a major investor in SSA’s market, representing 4 percent of total investment, followed by China, 
India, Singapore, and Japan (Copley, Maret-Rakotondrazaka, and Sy 2014; UNCTAD 2014). 
 
Chinese FDI in SSA 
Data on outbound Chinese FDI flows, as reported by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
(MOFCOM), 1  do not conform to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
definition of FDI (see annex 2), which only takes private investment into account. By contrast, the MOFCOM 
definition includes private and public financial flows (e.g., from state-owned enterprises) from the mainland China; 
it does not include Chinese owned-FDI passing through offshore finance centers (e.g., Hong Kong SAR, China; 
the Cayman Islands; Luxembourg; etc.). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that many companies, although required 
by law to register with government agencies, choose not to go through the time-consuming registration process 
(Shen 2013). 
Data from MOFCOM (2014) indicate that Chinese FDI flows to SSA reached US$3.1 billion in 2013, 
which would represent 7 percent of global investment in the region (Figure 7), a share that is rapidly approaching 
that of the United States (7.3 percent). Moreover, the total stock of Chinese FDI in SSA was recorded at almost 
US$24 billion, about 5 percent of SSA’s total FDI stock. These figures would imply that the presence of Chinese 
investment in SSA remains limited. For example, the ratio of Chinese FDI to SSA’s aggregate GDP was just 1.5 
percent in 2012, albeit up sharply from 0.1 percent in 2003. Meanwhile, the share of Chinese FDI in SSA’s 
aggregate gross fixed capital stock would appear to have grown quite modestly, from 0.37 percent in 2003 to 0.78 
percent in 2012. However, when considering these figures, the caveats about data quality and completeness noted 
above should be borne in mind. 
 
                                                          
member countries that are not OECD members (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania), plus 
Andorra, Bermuda, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino. Transition economies include Southeastern Europe, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia. Developing economies include all economies not specified above. For 
statistical purposes the data for China do not include the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong SAR), Macao 
Special Administrative Region (Macao SAR) or Taiwan Province of China.”   
1 See the discussions in MOFCOM (2003–2014)   
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Figure 7 Chinese FDI Flows to SSA, 2003–13 (US$, millions) 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2014, MOFCOM 2014 
Although modest in relative terms, the volume of Chinese FDI in SSA has increased substantially over 
the past decade.1 A dramatic spike in FDI in 2008 was largely attributable to a single transaction, the US$5.6 
billion purchase of a 20 percent share in South Africa’s Standard Bank by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC) (The New York Times 2007). The deal was approved in 2007 and completed in March 2008; it was 
a major operation for ICBC, one of China’s largest state-owned commercial banks. This acquisition reflects a 
relatively new strategy for Chinese investment in Africa in which Chinese investors purchase shares in reputable 
and experienced firms (although without holding a controlling interest) and then work in partnership to explore 
new business opportunities. Through its alliance with Standard Bank, ICBC now has access to an extensive 
financial network in SSA that will greatly facilitate the provision of financial services to Chinese investors in the 
region. If this deal is excluded, the data would show Chinese FDI in Africa remaining constant during 2008–09 
and then gradually increasing from 2010 onward. 
 
Chinese FDI in SSA Is Becoming Increasingly Diversified 
The scope of Chinese investment in SSA is extensive. Chinese FDI reaches almost all African countries, even 
those that do not have a formal diplomatic relation with China (e.g., São Tomé and Príncipe). However, the bulk 
of Chinese investment is focused on a few resource-rich countries. South Africa is the top destination, followed 
by Zambia, Nigeria, Angola, and Zimbabwe (Figure 8a; MOFCOM 2014). At the sector level, however, the most 
recent data reveal a growing diversification in investment targets. At 30 percent, extractive industries still account 
for the largest share,2 but finance, construction, and manufacturing now make up half of total FDI. 
Investment in these sectors is particularly strong in countries that have benefitted from more recent FDI, 
such as Ethiopia. Other important sectors include commercial services (5 percent); scientific research, technology 
and geological prospecting (4.1 percent); wholesale and retail commerce (2.7 percent); agriculture (2.5 percent); 
and real estate (1.1 percent) (Figure 8b; State Council of China 2013). 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Despite Africa’s increasing importance as a trade partner, Chinese FDI to the region represents only a small share of China’s 
total FDI portfolio. In 2013, SSA accounted for only 4 percent of China’s outbound FDI stock, a level that has been virtually 
unchanged since the mid-2000s.   
2 In Figure 8, we have modified the sector names from the English edition of State Council of China (2013) based on the 
original Mandarin version of the report. Thus, 摖䪎₩ is tranlated as “extractive industry” (different from the original 
translation, “mining”), 摠娜₩ is “finance”, ㆉ䷠₩ is “construction,” and Ⓟ抯₩ is “manufacturing.” Other translations 
include “commercial services” (䱮忐✛⟕┰㦜┰₩), “scientific research, technology, and geological prospecting” (䱠ⷵ䪣
䴅ᇬ㔏㦾㦜┰✛⦿德╧㩴₩), “wholesale and retail commerce” (㔈♠✛榅➽₩), “agriculture” (␫㨦䓶䂣₩), “real estate” 
(㓎⦿ℶ₩), and “other” (␅Ⅵ).   
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Figure 8 Chinese FDI in SSA, by Country and Sector 
a.Chinese FDI in SSA, by country ($US, million) 
 
Source: MOFCOM 2014 
b. Chinese FDI in SSA, by sector (percent) 
 
Source: State Council of China 2013 
 
Factor Intensity and Job Creation 
Very little is known about the relative factor intensity of Chinese investment in SSA and its contribution to job 
creation. However, a database produced by FDI Intelligence, a division of The Financial Times specialized in 
tracking FDI investment projects around the world,1 allows for some limited analysis of these dynamics. This 
database only includes Greenfield projects by Chinese investors in SSA. Between January 2003 and June 2014, a 
total of 156 projects were recorded, a small sample even compared with the MOFCOM statistics, but one that 
provides important information on the relationship between investment and job creation. 
Table 2 FDI Trends by Sector 
Business activity No of projects Jobs created  Capital Investment 
  Total Average Total 
($USm) 
Average 
($USm) 
Manufacturing  77 39,343 510 13,283.90 172.50 
Sales, marketing, and support 23 350 15 148.70 6.50 
Extraction 14 14,897 1,064 8,726.10 623.30 
Education and training  8 606 75 73.00 9.10 
Business services 8 142 17 84.00 10.50 
Construction 4 5,661 1,415 4,649.70 1,162.40 
Electricity 4 264 66 1,351.00 337.80 
Retail 4 154 38 32.10 8.00 
ICT and Internet Infrastructure 4 1,290 322 1,850.00 462.50 
Logistics, distribution, and 
transportation 
3 400 133 146.80 48.90 
Other business activities 7 1,094 156 149.60 21.40 
Total 156 64,201 411 30.494.90 195.50 
Source: FDI Intelligence, The Financial Times Ltd.  
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; ICT = information and communications technology. 
                                                          
1 All project data are based on public information.   
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Of the 156 projects recorded in the database, manufacturing projects have generated the highest number of total 
jobs at about 39,000, as indicated in Table 2. Manufacturing projects represent more than half of all jobs created 
by the entire sample, although their average capital investment is smaller than that of projects in other sectors. This 
suggests that the relocation of Chinese manufacturing firms to SSA could have a substantial impact on employment. 
Extractive industries and the construction sector averaged the largest project size in investment and job creation. 
Government-led projects tended to be much larger than private projects and created more jobs (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 FDI Trends for Public and Private Projects 
Type of FDI Job created Capital investment 
 No.of projects Total Average Total ($USm) Average 
($USm) 
Government-
led 
93 46262 497 21509.46 231.28 
Private-led 56 16032 286 6079.94 108.57 
Source: FDI Intelligence, The Financial Times Ltd. 
The 10 Chinese companies with the highest-value investment projects in the sample account for 38 percent of total 
job creation and 39 percent of total capital investment. Among these firms, Beiqi Foton Motor, a state-owned 
automotive manufacturing company, created the most jobs on average (Table 4). 
Table 4 Top 10 Chinese Firms by Job Creation and Capital Investment 
Company name Job created Capital investment 
 Total Average per 
project 
Total 
($USm) 
Average 
($USm) 
Huawei Technologies 2,188 198 1,626.60 147.90 
China Nonferrous Metal Mining 6,064 606 2,011.80 201.20 
ZTE 2,404 240 406.70 40.70 
China Central Television 241 30 85.90 10.70 
China National Petroleum 1,071 153 6,773.00 967.60 
Powerway Renewable Energy 1,347 269 133.30 26.70 
Beiqi Foton Motor 9,407 2,351 663.50 165.90 
The China-Africa Development Fund 76 19 44.00 11.00 
ZTS International Industrial (G-Tide) 656 218 71.00 23.70 
GAIG Stock (Guangzhou Automobile) 1,008 336 128.20 42.70 
Source: FDI Intelligence from The Financial Times Ltd  
Note: ZTE = Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation; ZTS = Zhong Trading Solutions 
 
Comparing Official Chinese FDI Data with Alternative Sources 
A number of research institutions and international agencies have begun to specialize in tracking information on 
Chinese FDI from other sources, including corporate websites and news reports. The China Global Investment 
Tracker (CGIT), a joint initiative of the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute, is a publicly 
available database that identifies and records Chinese FDI projects over US$100 million. Its coverage is wider 
than that of the MOFCOM database, and it includes projects that are implemented through offshore financial 
centers. However, CGIT does not include projects below US$100 million, a very high threshold that many Chinese 
investors do not reach. In addition, the data are based on publicly stated commitments, which often differ from 
actual investment flows. 
Comparing Chinese FDI in SSA as recorded by MOFCOM/UNCTAD with the figures in CGIT reveals 
a remarkable difference between the two data sets (Figure 9). The CGIT estimate is US$61 billion, more than 2.5 
times the MOFCOM estimate of US$24 billion. However, although the total values differ significantly between 
the two databases, the direction and trend of Chinese investment in SSA appear to be similar. 
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Figure 9 Total Chinese FDI in SSA, CGIT, and MOFCOM Estimates (US$ billions) 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2014; MOFCOM 2014; America enterprise institute and Heritage Foundation “China Global 
Investment Tracker” 2014 
Contracts record investment commitments, not actual investment flows. Nevertheless, contracts may be treated as 
a reliable indicator of future investment values. By 2013, the value of Chinese contracts in SSA had reached US$82 
billion, after increasing by an average of US$13.5 billion per year since 2009 (Figure 10). Moreover, SSA 
accounted for about 35 percent of the total value of Chinese contracts worldwide. The majority of these investment 
contracts were in the energy sector, particularly hydropower, and in the transportation sector, including roads, 
seaports, and aviation projects. Inadequate infrastructure is a major constraint on economic growth across SSA. 
Thus, China’s involvement in infrastructure projects may help African firms to improve integration into regional 
and international markets. 
 
Figure 10 Chinese Contracts in SSA (US$ value and % of total contracts) 
 
America enterprise institute and Heritage Foundation “China Global Investment Tracker” 2014 
Note: LHS = Left hand side; RHS= Right hand side 
 
SSA’s FDI in China Remains Marginal 
Despite the intensifying economic ties between China and SSA, investment overwhelmingly flows in one direction. 
FDI from SSA to China amounted to US$1.4 billion in 2012, just 1.2 percent of the total FDI that China received 
that year. Most SSA-to-China FDI originates from Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles, and South Africa. It includes 
investments in the petrochemicals, manufacturing, and wholesale and retail industries, among other sectors.  
Mauritius is not only the largest African investor in China, but ranks 15th among all investors in China. 
This is largely the result of a “double taxation” agreement between Mauritius and China and Mauritius’ status as 
an offshore financial center.1 However, even this amount is insignificant as a percentage of China’s total inbound 
FDI (0.92 percent in 2011) and Mauritius’s total outbound FDI (2.09 percent in 2011) (MOFCOM 2013). 
MOFCOM’s “Annual Cooperative Audit Online of National Foreign Investment Enterprises” in 2012 indicates 
that Mauritius has the largest number of investment projects in China of any country in SSA. 2 Mauritius is 
followed by Seychelles, another offshore financial center, with South Africa and Nigeria ranking third and fourth, 
respectively (Table 5). 
                                                          
1 Mauritian offshore banking laws permit 100 percent foreign ownership, include no minimum foreign capital requirement, 
provide for a flat corporate and income tax rate of 15 percent, impose no tax on dividends, and allow free repatriation of profits, 
dividends, and capital, among other incentives. Investors in Mauritius-based foreign enterprises, which in turn invest in China, 
enjoy all of these financial benefits (U.S. Department of Commerce 2014; Shinn and Eisenman 2012).   
2 This is an online audit and it is therefore possible that the actual number of projects is greater than these figures indicated.   
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Table 5 Top 10 Countries in SSA by Number of Investment Projects in China 
Country Number of Projects Share of SSA’s total projects in China (%) 
Mauritius 1,657 54.76 
Seychelles 877 28.98 
South Africa 201 6.64 
Nigeria 67 2.21 
Liberia 20 0.66 
Angola 17 0.56 
Zambia 15 0.50 
Madagascar 11 0.36 
Sudan 11 0.36 
Ghana 10 0.33 
Namibia 10 0.33 
South Africa invested more than half a billion dollars in China between 2002 and 2012. Several well-
known South African multinationals operate in China, including SAB Miller and Sasol, an energy conglomerate 
that has invested in China’s coal mining sector (Zafar 2007). However, the overall number of South African 
investment projects has been declining steadily, from 92 projects in 2003 to just 19 in 2012 (MOFCOM 2013).  
Nigeria is the fourth largest African investor in China. Very little is known about these investments, 
although limited firm-level details are available in the MOFCOM audit described above. Trading companies 
represent 42 percent of all Nigerian firms in China, followed by companies that produce business consulting (14 
percent); equipment and machinery (9 percent); textiles, apparel, and footwear (9 percent); chemicals (5 percent); 
and metal products (5 percent). Trading companies play an essential role in exporting Chinese goods worldwide. 
In 2005, an estimated 22 percent of Chinese exports passed through trading intermediaries (Ahn, Khandelwal, and 
Wei 2010). Nigerian trading firms specialize in exporting Chinese products to Africa and importing African 
products to China. Some Nigerian trading firms are subsidiaries of a Chinese parent company, often in the 
manufacturing sector. These subsidiaries are usually registered in China with a small amount of capital. Their 
primary mission is to support and facilitate the operations of the Chinese parent firm in Nigeria or other countries 
in SSA. 
 
Chinese FDI in SSA during the Global Financial Crisis 
The 2008–09 global financial crisis had only a limited impact on SSA, in part because African financial markets 
were small and relatively insulated from global volatility. And despite the ensuing drop in commodity prices and 
export volumes, many African countries had sufficient resources to pursue fiscal stabilization policies. Much of 
Africa’s impressive resilience during this turbulent period was the result of sustained macroeconomic reforms 
undertaken during the previous decade, including measures to liberalize trade, improve the business environment, 
privatize many state-owned enterprises, and strengthen critical infrastructure such as power grids and road 
networks. However, the effect of the crisis on commodity prices had a strong negative impact on extractive 
industries worldwide and many firms operating in SSA were forced to close. 
China reacted vigorously to the crisis, launching a set of policy measures designed to boost demand and 
stimulate the economy. The benchmark lending rate was repeatedly lowered and the government initiated a large-
scale investment program. Important tax reforms were also introduced, including a significant move toward a 
value-added tax system. As demand in Western economies stagnated, Chinese exporters looked to alternative 
markets, particularly in Africa. The Chinese government supported this shift by further easing requirements and 
decentralizing regulatory procedures for FDI and broadening financing channels for firms to operate overseas 
(Rosen and Hanemann 2009). Anecdotal evidence suggests that while many Western private investors were 
withdrawing from Africa, Chinese state-owned enterprises with access to subsidized credit from their policy banks, 
including the Exim Bank of China and the China Development Bank, were able to expand their operations not 
only in SSA but worldwide, as evidenced by a surge in acquisitions. For example, in June 2009, China 
Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), a state-owned oil company, bought Addax Petroleum Corporation, a Swiss 
oil exploration firm, for US$7.24 billion to secure oil reserves in West Africa and Iraqi Kurdistan (Bloomberg 
2009). China’s total outbound FDI more than doubled in 2008, even as global FDI flows fell by 15 percent, and in 
2009, while global FDI plummeted, Chinese outbound FDI still managed to grow by 1 percent (Salidjanova 2011). 
Ultimately, the global financial crisis accelerated a process of outbound investment liberalization that China had 
initiated in the early 2000s. This was also reflected in the surge in Chinese financing for overseas infrastructure 
projects, as Chinese infrastructure financing commitments rose from US$3.5 billion in 2007 to US$5.1 billion in 
2009 (Chen 2013). 
Many local governments in China introduced new preferential loan programs designed to support export-
oriented companies during the crisis. For example, in December 2008, the Exim Bank of China’s Zhejiang Branch 
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established a fund of RMB100 million (roughly US$16.3 million) to provide loans to export-oriented firms in 
Ningbo with a view to expanding their operations.1 In April 2009, CITIC Bank’s Wenzhou Branch, supported by 
the Wenzhou Municipal Bureau of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, provided RMB3 billion (just under 
US$500 million) in loans to 100 export-oriented local enterprises; half of this amount was devoted to helping local 
firms explore new opportunities in international markets. In addition to these credit programs, CITIC Bank also 
created a comprehensive package of preferential measures designed to lower the operating costs of local firms 
(Wenzhou Daily 2009). 
An analysis of Chinese M&As during the crisis confirms the conclusion that many Chinese firms viewed 
the financial crisis as an opportunity to increase their presence in global markets. For instance, Chinese M&As in 
the mining sector increased throughout the 2000s, reaching their peak in 2009 (Figure 11; Deloitte and 
Mergermarket Group 2010b), even as many international competitors faltered.2 
Figure 11 Chinese Outbound M&A in the Mining Sector, from 2003 to the First Half of 2010 (number of 
operations) 
 
Source: Deloitte and Mergermarket Group, 2010b 
Chinese M&As are expected to increase in the coming years, with Africa as their primary focus. In a 2010 survey 
of mining corporations based in Mainland China, 76 percent of the industry experts interviewed believed Africa 
to be the most important region for future Chinese M&As (Figure 12; Deloitte and Mergermarket Group 2010a).3 
According to the Mergermarket Group’s comprehensive review of African M&As in 2013, two of the top 10 
M&As in Africa were between Chinese companies and partner firms in SSA. China National Petroleum 
Corporation’s acquisition of a 28 percent stake in ENI East Africa SpA from Eni SpA was the single largest deal, 
valued at US$4.2 billion. In addition, Sinopec Group acquired a 10 percent stake in Marathon Oil Corporation’s 
Angolan offshore oil and gas field block 31, valued at US$1.5 billion (Mergermarket Group 2013). 
                                                          
1 The Exim Bank of China signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ningbo Municipal Bureau of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation and Yinzhou Bank to support local export-oriented companies (Ningbo News 2008).   
2 For example, in March 2009, Songshan Mining Co. Ltd entered into an option agreement with Tanzanian Royalty Exploration 
Corporation to acquire Tanzanian Royalty’s interest in the Kabanga nickel mining licenses in northwestern Tanzania. During 
an interview, Li Songshan, the chairman of Songshan Mining Co. Ltd, said that he decided to initiate another round of 
negotiations, which eventually resulted in a successful deal, after noticing that many Western investors were leaving the 
industry (China Industrial Economy News 2010; Bloomberg 2009).   
3One reason for the increasing popularity of Africa among Chinese mining companies is the proposed Resource Super-Profits 
Tax (RSPT) on mining company profits in Australia, the traditional destination country for mining-related investments from 
China. The RSPT was proposed in 2010 and constitutes a 40 percent tax on windfall profits from the exploration of Australia’s 
nonrenewable resources. The current Australian government is in the process of repealing this tax (Sanyal and Darby 2010–
2011; Taylor 2014). 
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Figure 12 Focus of Future Chinese Mining Sector FDI, Industry Expert Survey, 2010 
 
Source: Deloitte and Mergermarket Group, 2010a 
Note: Respondents may have selected multiple answers 
 
4. Rise of Chinese Private Investment in SSA 
The traditional focus of government-led FDI in Africa has been on natural resources1 and related infrastructure, 
with Chinese companies building the pipelines, power stations, roads, railways, and seaports necessary for the 
extraction and transportation of oil, minerals, and other natural resources. As in the rest of the world, China’s 
engagement in Africa has involved a tight link between trade, investment, and finance. In what has become known 
as the “Angola model,” this relationship starts with the Exim Bank of China providing a line of credit, often at 
concessional rates, to the government of a resource-rich country. This credit line is secured by a long-term 
agreement on resource rights. Chinese firms then compete for the various large infrastructure projects that will 
undergird the development of the country’s resource sector (e.g., oilfields, mines, processing facilities, 
transportation networks, etc.) and will be paid directly by the Exim Bank of China. While the natural resource 
sector remains an important focus of Chinese FDI, manufacturing investment in SSA has increased significantly 
in recent years, reaching 15.3 percent of total Chinese FDI in SSA in 2012. China developed its domestic 
manufacturing industry by concentrating its cheap labor and abundant capital in SEZs and industrial parks. Within 
these zones, land and infrastructure bottlenecks were relieved and a competitive business environment was 
established. This approach to industrialization has been so successful that variations on the model have been 
adopted in other countries, such as Cambodia, Mauritius, and Vietnam. However, China’s original set of 
competitive advantages has been shifting over time; among other key changes, manufacturing wages have risen 
from US$150 per month in 2005 to US$500 in 2012, reaching more than US$600 in coastal regions (Dinh et al. 
2012). 
Faced with increasing labor costs, many Chinese manufacturing firms have begun relocating to countries 
with lower wage rates, including several in SSA. China has facilitated this outsourcing process by officially 
sponsoring the construction of five SEZs in African countries (see table A4.6 in annex 4) to attract public and 
private investors. Although these SEZs were set up five to seven years ago, all are still in their initial development 
phase. Four of the five SEZs currently have fewer than 10 tenant companies operating in them (Mauritius’ Jinfei 
Zone had no companies operating in it prior to July 2013). Many firms have signed memoranda of understanding 
but have not yet begun to invest. However, those companies that have started operating in the SEZs typically 
employ a large number of African workers: Zambia Chambishi currently employs 7,973 workers, Nigeria Ogun 
employs 1,619, and Ethiopia Eastern employs 1,600 (Bräutigam and Tang 2011). 
Although government-led SEZs have thus far achieved only mixed results in SSA, the rise of Chinese 
private investment has been spectacular. In 2002, only four of the 21 Chinese FDI projects in Africa recorded by 
MOFCOM were privately owned; by 2013, 1,217 of 2,282 projects were private, or 53 percent of the total (Shen 
2014). With regard to value, private investment made up about 45 percent of total Chinese FDI in SSA. This 
remarkable increase in private investment is largely due to a set of measures adopted since 2004 aimed at 
promoting Chinese investment overseas.2 In addition, a number of funds were set up to support investment in 
                                                          
1 The Chinese government has strongly encouraged overseas investments in the natural resource sector. In October 2004, the 
National Development and Reform Commission and the Exim Bank of China jointly issued a circular to promote overseas 
investment in four specific areas, the first of which was “resource exploration projects to mitigate the domestic shortage of 
natural resources” (Salidjanova 2011; NDRC 2004). Africa, with its abundant natural resources and inexpensive investment 
opportunities, particularly during the global financial crisis, has received considerable attention from large state-owned firms 
and small- and medium-size private companies.   
2 For example, provincial governments were delegated to vet and approve investment deals totaling US$30 million or less for 
natural resource–related projects or US$10 million or less for non-resource–related projects, which greatly simplified the 
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overseas processing activities, for example the Central Foreign Trade Development Fund of RMB2.3 billion 
(around US$375 million). In 2006, the MOFCOM and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce 
published a draft document calling on the government to recognize the international significance of Chinese private 
enterprise and establish policies to support Chinese firms in “going global”1 (Cheng and Ma 2007; MOFCOM and 
All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce 2006). Finally, China began offering tariff-free entry to more 
than 400 products (mostly manufactured goods) produced in Africa’s low-income countries, further incentivizing 
Chinese firms to relocate to SSA. The number of Chinese manufacturing projects in SSA rose from just seven in 
2004 to 75 in 2013. During 2009, at the height of the global financial crisis, some 70 Chinese manufacturing 
projects were underway in Africa and 66 of these projects were privately owned (Shen 2014). 
 
Impact of Chinese FDI in SSA: Case Studies 
Rigorous economic research on the impact of Chinese FDI in Africa is limited. Fu and Buckley (2014) claim that 
during 2004–10, Chinese FDI had a positive and significant impact on the long-run economic growth of recipient 
economies. Overall, Chinese FDI appears to have contributed positively to economic growth in Africa, even more 
than it has in Asia. Moreover, Chinese FDI has become a significant source of job creation in several developing 
economies. Weisbrod and Whalley (2011) focus their analysis on the period from 2005 to 2007, just before the 
global financial crisis. During this period, GDP growth in SSA averaged 6 percent and Chinese FDI flows 
accounted for up to 10 percent of total inbound FDI in several African countries. Weisbrod and Whalley use growth 
accounting to determine how much of this growth can be attributed to Chinese FDI. In addition, they run 
counterfactual growth accounting experiments for 13 countries in SSA, excluding Chinese FDI, for 2005–07 and 
2003–09. Overall, they find that Chinese FDI contributed an additional 0.5 percentage points or more to GDP 
growth, confirming the economic importance of Chinese investment.  
Even less is known about the specific economic impact of Chinese private FDI in Africa, although some 
important insights can be gleaned from an analysis of individual cases. A closer look at several major investment 
projects of Chinese private firms in Tanzania, Nigeria, and Ethiopia is presented below. 
 
Tanzania. Tanzania has been a major recipient of Chinese investment, the total stock of which had surged to 
US$541 million by 2012.2 Moreover, a rising share of this investment has originated from the private sector. 
Between 2002 and 2013, the number of Chinese private firms operating in the country increased from 30 to about 
300, with much of the increase recorded in the past couple years (Figure 13a). 
According to estimates from the Chinese Business Chamber of Tanzania, Chinese private companies have 
created more than 150,000 jobs, although more conservative estimates put the number at 80,000 jobs. By contrast, 
Tanzania’s SEZ, the Export Processing Zone Authority, has only created 15,100 jobs. Many Chinese firms provide 
on-the-job training to local workers and some also send Tanzanian managerial staff to China for training programs 
lasting from three months to one year. Most Chinese private firms are involved in low-tech, labor-intensive 
industries, such as light manufacturing and assembly, and many compete with domestic companies in Tanzania 
(Figure 13b). In several instances, local workers have started their own enterprises after leaving Chinese firms.  
The distribution of firms by sector shows that the majority of Chinese companies produce for the local 
market rather than for export. Over 90 percent of Chinese firms are located in the country’s largest city, Dar es 
Salaam. Interview respondents reported that the key reasons for this include its substantial market, its large labor 
force, and Dar es Salaam’s status as a major commercial center. 
 
 
                                                          
investment approval process, particularly for small- and medium-size private firms. In addition, the project proposal and 
feasibility study no longer required government approval (NDRC 2004; Cheng and Ma 2007). NDRC later raised the provincial 
government approval threshold to US$1 billion (NDRC 2014) for all projects that do not involve “sensitive countries or regions” 
or “sensitive industries.” “Sensitive countries or regions” refer to those states with which China does not have formal diplomatic 
relations, states that have been subjected to international sanctions, or conflict areas. “Sensitive industries” refers to basic 
telecommunication networks, cross-border water projects, large-scale land development projects, electricity transmission lines, 
power grids, and media projects, among others.   
1 “Going global” and “going out” are translations of 䎠ࠪ৫ᡈ⮕ (zou chu qu). This refers to the Chinese government’s strategy 
of encouraging overseas investment by Chinese firms.   
2 See Lu and Kweka (2013).   
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Figure 13 Chinese Firms in Tanzania and Distribution by Sector 
a.Chinese firms in Tanzania 
 
Source: Kweka and Lu 2013 
b.Distribution of Chinese firm in Tanzania, by sector 
 
Source: Kweka and Lu 2013 
 
Nigeria. The story of the Yuemei Group and its textile-focused industrial park in Nigeria provides an interesting 
example of the opportunities that African markets offer to Chinese firms. The Zhejiang-based Yuemei Group, a 
private textile manufacturer, currently owns 10 clothing factoriesand sales offices in Cameroon, Mali, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Tanzania, and Togo (Yuemei Group 2014a). However, between 1992 and 2009, it was solely an exporter 
shipping its products to Nigeria through Hong Kong SAR, China, trading companies. In 2000, Zhiming Xu, the 
CEO of Yuemei, decided to eliminate its intermediaries and set up its own sales office, China-Nigeria Textile Co., 
Ltd, in Lagos. The move gave Yuemei direct access to Nigeria’s huge textile market and its profit margin increased 
from 5 to 40 percent in a single year (Shen and Zhang 2009). In 2004, concerned that competition with China 
could wipe out its domestic textile industry, Nigeria adopted strict regulations on textile imports. Yuemei 
responded by investing US$1.2 million to establish a domestic manufacturing subsidiary, Jinmei (Nigeria) Textile 
Co., Ltd, in Nigeria’s Calabar Free Trade Zone (Yuemei Group 2014b). In 2006, the company set up a second 
overseas textile factory in Senegal through an initial investment of US$5 million (Shen and Zhang 2009).  
In 2007, the Yuemei Group invested more than US$50 million to construct the Yuemei-Nigeria Textile 
Industry Park, China’s first overseas textile industrial park, with a complete production chain of spinning, weaving, 
embroidery, knitting, and garment making (Nan 2012). By 2009, five textile firms had moved into the park and 
employed an estimated 1,000 local workers (FOCAC 2010). During the global financial crisis, Yuemei Group was 
able to increase its production and its sales continued to grow. The company’s CEO said that he “does not feel the 
influence of the financial crisis very much,” because “the average profit margin for domestic textile enterprises in 
China is 5 percent, and they surely cannot afford to lower the price. However, my margin is still 25 percent in 
Africa, providing a much larger space [to buffer its effects]” (Xinhua 2009). 
Ethiopia. The experience of the Huajian Group in Ethiopia is among the most well-known Chinese 
success stories in SSA. Huajian, one of China’s largest shoe manufacturers, invested about US$10 million in an 
Ethiopian factory to manufacture shoes for export to Europe and North America. Based on the achieved success, 
Huajian plans to further cooperate with the Government of Ethiopia and construct a dedicated industrial park with 
an estimated investment of US$2 billion. Ethiopia has many advantages as a manufacturing center, including a 
large pool of educated workers, very low wage rates, a strategic geographical location, and a government 
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determined to transform its economy by attracting foreign investors. During an interview, the chairman of Huajian 
Group emphasized the importance of the Ethiopian government’s investment policy: “We told the Ethiopian Prime 
Minister that we want nothing but a piece of land and good policy, and with that we will create a large number of 
exports within a decade” (FOCAC 2011). Before starting the operation, Huajian sent more than 90 Ethiopian 
workers to China for training to improve their technical skills (Huajian Group 2012). The Huajian factory opened 
in January 2012 and, remarkably, turned a profit in its very first year. In 2013, its 3,500 workers produced two 
million pairs of shoes (Hamlin, Gridneff, and Davison 2014). 
 
China’s Economic Rebalancing and Its Implications for SSA 
In the past, one of the key motivations for Chinese manufacturing firms to invest in Africa was to circumvent U.S. 
and EU trade restrictions on Chinese products and gain access to Western markets under preferential trade 
agreements with countries in SSA. This is no longer the case. In 2007–08, Gu (2009) interviewed 80 Chinese 
private firms located in Ghana, Madagascar, and Nigeria. The respondents indicated that the top reasons for 
investing in Africa were to gain access to largely untapped local consumer markets and avoid competition in an 
increasingly saturated Chinese market. 
More recent surveys by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) in 2012 
confirm and expand on these findings. Respondents identified the saturation of the Chinese domestic market (28 
percent of the respondents) and access to lower production costs (16 percent) as the primary incentives for Chinese 
firms to move to Africa (Figure 14). As low-cost investment opportunities become increasingly scarce in China, 
many firms are moving abroad in search of new opportunities. This is particularly true in the labor-intensive 
manufacturing sector, as real wages for semi-skilled Chinese workers have been rising at a rate of 15 percent per 
year since 2008, while wage rate increases in most developing countries have remained in the low single digits. It 
is expected that China will ultimately outsource much of its labor-intensive manufacturing sector to lower-cost 
countries (Lin and Wang 2014), thus opening opportunities for many countries in SSA. 
Figure 14 Chinese Firms’ Reported Motives for Investing in Africa, 2008–12 
 
Source: CCPIT, 2012 
Following its explosive growth over the past two decades, China is now an upper-middle-income country 
and rivals the United States for the title of world’s largest economy. However, China’s growth rate is slowing as 
the economy transforms, “rebalancing” from an intensive focus on production and exports to a more service-
oriented, consumption-based model. Meanwhile, the government continues to pursue important structural reforms 
to give a greater role to the private sector, improve efficiency, and spur innovation (Dollar 2014). As this process 
of rebalancing continues, it will entail positive and negative effects for China’s trade and investment partners in 
SSA. 
On the one hand, lower Chinese growth rates will decrease global demand for oil, minerals, and other 
natural resources and reduce international prices for these commodities, which are among the chief exports of 
many countries in SSA. Given that China has accounted for almost the entire increase in global demand for 
minerals and metals (e.g., copper, iron, lead, nickel, tin, and zinc) over the past 20 years, slowing growth in China 
will have a major impact on world commodity markets (Figure A4.1). Recent work by the International Monetary 
Fund (Drummond and Liu 2013) has shown that a 1 percentage point decrease in China’s real domestic fixed 
investment growth rate would lower SSA’s aggregate export growth rate by 0.6 percentage points. As one might 
expect, this effect appears to be larger for resource-rich countries and the countries in SSA that are likely to be 
most severely impacted are exporters of mining products, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, 
South Africa, and Zambia. However, China’s rebalancing also presents new export opportunities in the agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors. Countries in SSA that have sound investment frameworks, stable governance, and a 
healthy investment climate will be well positioned to leverage these opportunities. 
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5. Conclusion and Policy Implication 
China’s rebalancing has the potential to bring great benefits to countries throughout SSA, but it also comes with 
considerable challenges. During the past two decades, China’s growth has driven most of the global increases in 
the demand for commodities such as oil, aluminum, copper, and iron ore. As China moves toward a more 
consumption-driven growth model, the demand for and price of these commodities are expected to be significantly 
lower than in the past. This will have a direct, negative impact on the commodity producers in Africa; but it will 
also offer new opportunities to restructure and transform African economies. Countries that have become 
excessively reliant on natural resource exports will need to step up efforts to diversify their industrial and 
agricultural sectors, while a decline in fiscal revenues from the resource sector may force difficult choices in public 
spending. Policy measures to help raise the competitiveness of sectors that are suffering from import competition 
from China may also help SSA to respond well to the expected changes. 
The window of opportunity created by China’s rebalancing will not remain open indefinitely, but a 
pragmatic reform agenda designed to increase productivity in the tradable sector and enhance cooperation with the 
Chinese public and private sectors could greatly accelerate growth and enhance livelihoods in countries throughout 
SSA. In many countries, this will require a clear shift in policy and institutions toward a pro-growth environment. 
The specific reforms may not be those that China undertook, but they should be comprehensive enough to 
demonstrate commitment to a pro-growth strategy despite political changes and exogenous shocks. 
Africa can become more competitive. Historically, China’s competitiveness was built on a number of 
factors including low unit-labor costs, an abundance of subsidized credit, and an undervalued exchange rate. In 
addition, China’s accession into the WTO in 2001, together with a series of reformative approaches, has brought 
about enhancement in total factor productivity (TFP), which has also strengthened China’s competitiveness. The 
recent rise in labor costs and appreciation of the renminbi will reduce China’s export competitiveness, at least in 
the near term, and benefit low-cost developing countries. African countries have a unique opportunity to attract 
strategic, job-creating investments from foreign investors, including China. For this to happen, countries in SSA 
need to develop a supportive policy framework to (a) lower transport costs, (b) eliminate formal and informal 
barriers that undermine investments in regional processing activity, (c) increase the flexibility of labor markets, 
and (d) ensure effective competition policies. 
There is a need to build on successful experiences. Many African governments are building effective 
partnerships with China. A well-known example—although not the only one—is the success of the Huajian Group 
shoe manufacturer in Ethiopia. It required the commitment of the country’s top leadership to help reduce 
transaction costs for investors, the development of an industrial park, and a vision that combined Ethiopia’s 
comparative advantages—high-quality leather and low-cost labor—with China’s financial investment and 
knowledge transfer. 
China’s activities in Africa should be compatible with Africa’s needs, particularly for transformation and 
diversification. For example, it may be time to move away from the traditional model of infrastructural investment 
through resource-backed loans and tied aid, to ensuring that investment in infrastructure (from China and 
elsewhere) closely reflects Africa’s development needs. Reciprocal agreements to lower tariffs on imports of 
specific products (e.g., in agriculture) and the establishment of joint ventures in sectors of mutual interest, 
including services, may contribute to strengthening the economic links between China and Africa. 
The rise of Chinese private investment may contribute to Africa’s transformation and job creation. Private 
investment is likely to grow exponentially, in line with the Chinese government’s efforts to encourage local 
companies to go global and explore international markets. African counterparties should make the most of these 
new developments. Local governments have a chance to attract a large share of this investment and should learn 
to interact productively with private investors, ensuring joint benefits in growth, local employment, technology 
transfer, and training. 
A final recommendation has to do with data and information. The lack of data on Chinese FDI in Africa 
limits research and sound analysis to support policy making. In particular, official FDI data collected by China’s 
MOFCOM underestimate actual investment flows. An improvement in the availability of FDI data would 
significantly enhance policy makers’ knowledge and contribute to a better policy dialogue. The Chinese 
government should improve the registration system for firms investing abroad and capture a larger number of 
investing entities, in particular small-scale manufacturing and commerce projects. Moreover, regular follow-up 
surveys with firms operating outside China could help clarify their final investment destinations (especially those 
that claim to invest in Mauritius and Seychelles) and the investment amount should be adjusted if there are any 
second-stage investments. 
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